![]() ![]() My failure to ask permission is not a harm unless this sort of act is already clearly established as something I need permission to do. Finally, the problem is not that I didn’t ask permission to come into your house. The harm principle is only concerned with harms that are in fact real harms, and not with people’s opinions or perceptions of actions as harmful. Likewise, the problem cannot be that my action would generate fear in you, and so therefore must be counted as a real harm. Attempting to break into your home (without succeeding) would show the same lack of respect for you, but would not generate the same sense of wronging. Ripstein argued that this may be true, but that it is not the case that lack of character or respect is the source of our feeling of wrong. First, it might appear that the problem with this act of harmless wrongdoing is that it shows a lack of character or respect. ![]() ![]() Ripstein also cleared away three ‘side issues,’ issues that might at first glance appear to be the source of the wrong done, but which in fact are not. No identifiable harm has been done to you, but you probably feel wronged despite this, and Ripstein asserted that the harm principle cannot explain this sense of wrong. The case is one in which I let myself into your house, picking the lock so as to leave no trace, and while wearing a hairnet, protective clothing, and gloves, take a nap in your bed. To introduce the sovereignty principle, Ripstein invoked a hypothetical example of harmless wrongdoing, one which he assumed that (despite the lack of resulting harm) his audience would agree should be prohibited by the criminal law. In particular, Ripstein argued that the sovereignty principle can do something the harm principle does not: it can explain why harm matters in the cases where it does and also why harm does not matter in the cases where it seems not to do so, as in harm inflicted on oneself, or harm incurred from participating in consensual activities, as a fair contest, for example. He further articulated his own alternative to the harm principle, the "sovereignty principle," which attempts to take more seriously the idea that each individual can have a sphere of equal freedom. Ripstein then introduced what was to be the main thesis of his presentation: if we take this idea of sovereignty seriously, it forces us to abandon the harm principle. Ripstein noted that immediately following the passage in which he introduces the harm principle, Mill states that the harm principle serves to create a sphere in which the individual can be thought of as sovereign. Simply stated, the harm principle holds that only those acts that harm or threaten harm to others should be prohibited. Mill's well-known harm principle, often taken to an important basis for liberal views of the criminal law. Professor Ripstein began his lecture with a reiteration of J.S. Speaker: Arthur Ripstein, Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto ![]()
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